Abstract. Using an estimated large-scale New Keynesian model, we assess the consequences of introducing a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Our results indicate that no country would significantly benefit from introducing any form of fiscal union. Comparing long-term, that is, steady state, effects we have winners and losers depending on the scenario. Differences in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks are minor. This also explains why welfare differences are small across the fiscal union scenarios. A counterfactual exercise indicates that with a fiscal union regime already installed at the start of EMU, key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly while debt dynamics would have changed notably.
INTRODUCTION
The debt crisis in the EMU has provoked a debate about ways to advance the development of the euro area. There are various positions on this subject. On the one hand, there have been calls for the individual states to strengthen compliance with European fiscal rules and reinforce individual responsibility within a decentralised framework. Politically, this orientation has in recent years led to various resolutions, such as the fiscal compact (see Bundesbank, 2015 , for a discussion). Low debt levels in the public sector and credible compliance with European fiscal rules are highly crucial for the decentralised framework.
On the other hand, many are calling for a more centralised framework with deeper fiscal integration given that this has already taken place for monetary policy following the introduction of the monetary union (see, among others, Bargain et al., 2013; Boadway, 2004; Bordo et al., 2013; Hallet et al., 1999; Kenen, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Mundell, 1961; van Rompuy, 2012) . Iara (2016) discusses the most recent proposals. The economic argument behind this demand is that a completely symmetric countries both in terms of structure as well as in parameter values, the transmission of asymmetric shocks is the same in the respective economies. This no longer applies if important features such as price and wage rigidities or openness, to name a few, are different. Consequently, the different parametrization and heterogeneity of the countries is one crucial factor, which makes our results more reliable and realistic. Yet, our model -as well as the whole modelling class -has a potentially important drawback that should be mentioned here: politico-economic aspects such as moral hazard are generally not illustrated in larger New Keynesian DSGE models. But every form of fiscal union can potentially generate incentives for free riding, for example. With this in mind, the findings presented here should be interpreted as an analysis of the 'mechanical' effects, without regard to the incentives to make policy changes. Therefore, the inclusion of politico-economic incentives in larger general equilibrium models should remain on the research agenda in addressing this issue. 2 Our results indicate that no country would significantly benefit from introducing any form of fiscal union. Differences in terms of business cycle statistics are minor. Furthermore, differences in international risk sharing, for example, through fiscal transfers along the cycle between the various forms of a fiscal union, are principally very low: The degree of fiscal integration has a negligible effect on the reaction of the economy to shocks. The reason is that in the estimated model, fiscal shocks are a negligible driver of key macroeconomics variables and fiscal spillovers are small. Not surprisingly, our simulations further show that the changes in welfare gains that would materialise in a fiscal union are likely to be small both for Germany and the euro area. In order to address the often politically driven call for a fiscal union when risk premia are rising, we include those as well and find that the welfare ordering of the different forms of a fiscal union would not change even in the presence of increasing default risk.
Differences may emerge in the long term, however, because more fiscal integration leads to a new long-term equilibrium -and consequently to structural changes in output, employment and other factors. Winners and losers change with the regime considered. When it comes to the per-capita equalisation of public revenues, Germany would primarily experience a negative impact on the fiscal deficit, whereas all variables in Germany would be negatively affected by tax harmonisation as a result of the increase in the tax burden on labour income (including social security contributions). In this latter case, the new long-term equilibrium would be characterised by higher unemployment, lower gross domestic product (GDP) and lower private consumption in Germany, for example. Conversely, this could apply in the case of a central fiscal authority where Germany could gain while the rest of the euro area could lose. Our simulations show that a transition from one regime to another could take place relatively quickly at least for some macroeconomic variables.
In the closing counterfactual analysis, we examine how GDP, private consumption and the debt ratio would have developed in the past decade had a fiscal union (in accordance with the three aforementioned forms) been created at 2. Equally absent from this paper are questions related to how financial frictions interact with the risk sharing between consumers of both countries.
MODEL DESCRIPTION AND FISCAL UNION SCENARIOS
The current status quo in the euro area with national fiscal policies is illustrated by a three-region New Keynesian DSGE model, where regions are indexed by i = a,b,c. The model includes involuntary unemployment, a highly disaggregated public sector and a comprehensive international trading structure for goods and bonds. Two regions, namely a and b, form a monetary union. Using Bayesian techniques and a rich fiscal data set, the model is estimated for Germany (region a), the rest of the euro area (region b) and the rest of the world (region c). The model is quite a prototypical modern international New Keynesian DSGE model and builds on Gadatsch et al. (2016) . To save space, we, therefore, relegate the formal model description and its calibration to the appendix and focus in detail only on fiscal policymaking in the main text.
Fiscal policymaking
Fiscal policy in the status quo is described by the standard fiscal policy equations in DSGE models. The issue of the pros and cons of a fiscal union is challenging for various reasons. The first obstacle lies in the question of what the term 'fiscal union' denotes exactly. Fuest and Peichl (2012) discuss five possible elements of a European fiscal union. These include (i) fiscal rules and corresponding policy coordination and supervision, (ii) a crisis resolution mechanism, (iii) a joint guarantee for government debt, (iv) fiscal transfer mechanisms between countries, and (v) a larger EU budget and European taxes. In line with Bargain et al. (2013) , we concentrate on elements (iv) and (v) which are more relevant in the medium and long term and for which our model can make meaningful predictions. We have decided on three potential scenarios which differ with respect to the degree of fiscal integration. 3 The first scenario, with the lowest degree of fiscal integration, represents a fiscal transfer mechanism and includes a per-capita equalisation of public revenues. This is similar to the fiscal equalisation systems in Germany or Switzerland. The second consists of a 'truly' European tax in the sense of a harmonised tax rate. In this case, labour taxes and social security levy rates are harmonised for both Germany and the rest of the euro area. Given that this scenario 'equalizes' incentives on the labour market, it constitutes a deeper form of fiscal integration. The farthest-reaching form of fiscal integration, our third alternative, illustrates a centralised supranational fiscal authority at European level. That is, elements (iv) and (v) are both taken into account. Those scenarios are largely in line with Bargain et al. (2013) and Evers (2015) .
The status quo
The real (CPI deflated) per-capita value of end-of-period government debt evolves according to a standard debt accumulation equation, 
minus primary revenues, denote government consumption and investment, respectively. As we assume full home bias here, which can be justified by the fact that there is evidence for a strong home bias in government procurement (see, among others, Brulhart and Trionfetti, 2004) , and because the budget constraint is CPI deflated, we correct for this by the relative price between home-country PPI and homecountry CPI, R 
for instruments X 2 fC G;i ; I G;i ; TR i ; w G;i g and . In order to guarantee stability in the debt ratio, for at least one instrument the coefficient n X;B G;i ;i must be positive (see, among others, Schmitt-Gal ı et al., 2007, for a discussion). ξ X,y,i can be interpreted as an adhoc automatic stabilizing component as in Coenen et al. (2013) . As in Leeper et al. (2009) , we allow for anticipation effects of fiscal policy with a weight of (1Àw X,a ). Following Coenen et al. (2013) , we assume that capital taxes are kept constant while consumption taxes follow an AR(1) process including anticipation effects but no reaction on debt or output deviations. The same holds for public employment and public wages. The precise parameterizations of the rules are based on a Bayesian estimation of the model and relegated to the online appendix to save space.
Revenue equalisation (RE)
Public revenue equalisation (RE) implies that a European fiscal authority generates revenues through taxes and levies and redistributes them in such a manner that the countries have the same per-capita revenue as a result of these 'European' tax and levy rates. European tax and levy rates generating the revenue that is redistributed between the member states are assumed to be a weighted average derived from the country-specific tax and levy rates (generating the same unionwide revenue ex ante) that are then applied to the country-specific tax and levy base.
5 Taking into account relative differences in domestic CPI, P i t , this implies that, in terms of region-a prices, the steady-state EU consumption tax rate is set 5. Note that, in the end, the supranational fiscal budget only serves as a balance sheet for redistributing tax revenues. Assuming supranational tax and levy rates only brings the system closer to existing federal fiscal unions. While deviations from these rates are not allowed in Germany, they are in Switzerland, for example.
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, where P i is population size of region i. This implies that real consumption tax revenues generated at the European level in per-capita terms are given by Rev
, expressed in prices of country a. We assume that an analogous proceeding holds for all the other tax rates and that aggregate European-level revenues are then equally redistributed to the two regions on a per-capita basis. This constitutes a form of risk sharing through fiscal transfers.
Every country is, however, able to set its own tax and levy rates that may deviate from the European average and/or allow them to react to debt and economic activity, thereby deviating from the European average. The reason for this is that, while countries may have different preferences for how an 'optimal' tax system should look like (which they would not want to transfer at a supranational level), the supranational level set the 'artificial' European tax rates as a redistributive device. This, to some extent, corresponds to the Swiss revenue equalisation scheme. Hence, for the case of consumption taxes, we assume that each region can still charge the tax rate s c,i
, which we assume to be the original steady-state level. The revenue obtained from consumption taxes for region a in per-capita terms is, thus, given by Rev For the national tax rates we assume that the rule (6) still applies, while we assume the European rate remains fixed at its steady-state level. While, at first sight, one could think that this would not change anything in the model, at least in steady state. Note, however, that because a fraction of domestic tax revenues is redistributed between the two regions on the basis of the 'artificial' European tax rate, the percapita redistribution of European revenues results in a transfer union.
6
In the revenue equalisation scenario, the spending side of the public sector is left untouched. The deficit is still given as the difference of each country's spending decision and the revenues that this country generates including its decision to deviate from the 'European' tax in line with equations (1-6).
Tax harmonisation (TH)
The second form of fiscal union that we describe is tax harmonisation (TH). In this form, the labour income tax and social security levy rates are standardised. Therefore, incentives on the labour market are 'equalized'. This implies that intratemporal consumption decisions are more aligned across countries hence promoting more risk sharing. All other fiscal instruments remain in the control of the individual countries. Again, the standardised labour income tax and social security rates are calculated such that they generate the same revenues as aggregating the originally country-specific tax rates does, analogous to what is described in equation (7). Although a change in revenues may not materialise 6. In the steady state, this would mean higher levels of debt in one country than in another. However, in this analysis we assume that, in the new and the old steady state, they must be at x d of GDP. Hence, another fiscal instrument must be adjusted to achieve this. We assume that the adjustment instrument is a per-capita tax so as to avoid distortions.
within the euro aggregate ex ante, this may very well occur at country level, thereby now effectively changing the levy rates in the respective countries. Given that these rates are now outside each country's control, we assume that it no longer reacts to debt and output deviations, implying that the new fiscal reaction for labour income tax and social security contribution rates is now given by
for X 2 fs w;i ; s sc;i g. It still contains the two shock terms that were previously estimated for the individual countries in the status quo to account for potential discretionary policy at the European level. These shock terms enter as a weighted average, and so does the autoregressive component, that is,
The remaining fiscal sector at the national level does not change.
Centralised supranational fiscal authority (CA)
The centralised supranational fiscal authority (CA) is the strongest form of fiscal union that we examine in this study. Under this regime, both the revenue-side and expenditure-side fiscal instruments are centralised, as is public debt. The European taxes, levies and expenditure components then react to pan-European public debt and the weighted business cycles. The result is, therefore, also a single budget equation for the state, which is supranational in this case. Both monetary and fiscal policy would in this case be completely determined at the supranational level, where both countries can be considered regions in the newly formed state.
In this scenario, the central equation for each fiscal instrument (seen here with consumption tax as an example again) is shown in equation (7). Note that, in this scenario, spending components are harmonised analogously. The European debt level is calculated using the revenues, which are applied to the weighted consumption, capital and payroll taxes of both countries, and the expenditures measured at a European level. The budget equation for the 'Fiscal State of Europe' is given by equation (9):
, where G EU t represents total European expenditures, and T EU t stands for the percapita tax payable by all optimising households. The share of the latter is (1Àl), a population-weighted average of optimising households in each region. Interest payments are represented by i EU t and are divided by the rate of inflation (p EU t , a weighted average, too) when calculating real values. Furthermore, note that, for the fiscal reaction functions, we still assume rules in line with equations (5) and (6) at the European level, where the instruments react to a deviation of European debt level from target as well as a weighted average of output deviations. In the European rules, it now again holds thatx
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RESULTS
The paramount interest lies in the issue of how (the introduction of) a fiscal union influences international risk sharing and hence impacts welfare. In doing so, it is essential to differentiate between long-term effects, transitional effects (i.e. short-term effects) and the impact on the business cycle. Finally, we will also look at the hypothetical question of how the debt ratio, GDP and other variables would have developed if a fiscal union had been introduced at the same time as the monetary union (known as a counterfactual analysis).
Long-term effects
The long-term effects of the respective fiscal union are illustrated in Table 1 . The findings are given as percentage (point) deviations relative to the status quo.
As outlined in the description of the equalisation of public revenues, this regime implies a permanent redistribution of revenues. Germany's 'better' fiscal position primarily resulting from higher tax bases implies redistribution of revenues from Germany to the rest of the euro area. This entails a higher primary deficit in Germany and a lower one in the rest of the euro area. Because of this fiscal redistribution, consumption and, thus, GDP are lower in Germany in the new equilibrium while it is higher in the rest of the euro area. However, the effects on GDP are not large. The per-capita tax is changed in order to keep debt ratios within the new steady state at 60% of the respective GDP pursuant to the Maastricht criteria. If we were to allow the debt ratio to vary, it would rise in Germany, whereas it would fall in the rest of the euro area.
In the case of tax harmonisation, all real variables are impacted because the actual labour income tax and levy rates change. In the original steady state, German personal income tax rates are slightly higher than those in the rest of the euro area, which holds conversely for social security contribution rates. After tax harmonisation, this implies a slight decrease in German personal income tax rates and increases in the social security contribution rates (an opposite for the rest of the euro area). However, the decrease in the labour income tax does not compensate for the significantly higher social security levies in Germany which results in an increase in the overall tax-and levy-induced distortions in the German economy. This negatively impacts employment, output and consumption. The rest of the euro area benefits due to the lower tax burden on the production factor labour. However, the effects are small. In the long term, Germany loses 0.16% of its GDP, whereas the rest of the euro area gains 0.1%. Similar figures result for private consumption and private investment. Unemployment also rises in Germany, whereas it falls in the other euro-area countries. The steep rise in social security levies in Germany reduces the country's primary deficit. In contrast, it increases in the rest of the euro area.
In the final scenario, the supranational fiscal authority, Germany seems to win while the rest of the euro area loses. This can (mechanically) be explained as follows. Because capital taxes rise in Germany, optimising households invest less, therefore, private investment falls. Private consumption rises. The steeply rising social security contributions overcompensate for the falling labour tax rate, N. Gadatsch et al. Fiscal Union ultimately resulting in a rise in unemployment (see description above). Overall, public consumption ends up being lower in the long term, which frees up resources for higher public investment. The latter makes its way into the production process in the form of an increase in private sector productivity, which boosts output. This effect plays the major role in increasing overall economic output in the long term. The reallocation of resources in the fiscal sector -from consumption to investment spending -reflects the estimated behaviour of the government (see section 2.1). Hence, the larger effects for Germany in this scenario are ultimately a political question. The primary deficit decreases as a result of the mentioned effects. For the rest of the euro area, some of these findings are reversed from a qualitative perspective. As a result, long-term GDP declines, while unemployment falls. Private consumption also falls, whereas private investment increases. This leads to a higher primary deficit in the rest of the euro area in the long term.
Transitional phase
As seen in Section 1, the individual regimes lead to different steady states. However, the specifics of the transitional phase from the status quo to a fiscal union and its duration are just as crucial for the policy analysis. Depending on which country is examined, this transfer is associated with costs or is profitable from a macroeconomic perspective. Figure 1 illustrates the transition from the status quo to a fiscal union. For the speed of adjustment, estimated parameters governing the degree of frictions in the economy -like for example price stickinessplay a crucial role. We see that in the scenarios of revenue equalization and tax harmonization, the bulk of the adjustments process ends after roughly 6-8 years.
The transition in the case of a centralised authority takes longer because the public capital stock, being the main driver of changes, only increases slowly.
Economic statistics
Key (business cycle) statistics regarding the economic implications of the various forms of fiscal union are illustrated in Table 2 . Generally speaking, the overall economic implications of the various scenarios are very similar. The indicators we examine here are standard deviations as well as autocorrelations and cross-correlations for selected key variables that indicate the moments in the business cycle. The standard deviations -a measure for volatility of macroeconomic variables -for employment are practically the same for Germany as for the rest of the euro area. Slightly higher standard deviations result under tax harmonisation and under a supranational fiscal authority. This is due to the lower number of fiscal instruments contributing to smoothing out the business cycle in these scenarios, which leads to a slightly higher volatility of Fiscal Union macro variables. Autocorrelations measure the persistence of shocks. We observe that the various forms of fiscal union and the status quo are very similar with regard to the autocorrelation of the variables. Hence, a fiscal union does not improve the shock absorption too much. While the centralised form of fiscal union results in a slightly higher persistence for German GDP and employment, it does not have any effect in this respect in the rest of the euro area. Similarly, we only see a notable increase in the cross-correlations -a measure for how synchronised business cycles are -of country-specific GDP and employment if we compare the centralised fiscal authority with the status quo. The pattern of consumption, too, changes very little from one scenario to the next. But the following is an important finding, at least for policy analysis: the synchronisation of the two business cycles increases by approximately 2% (cross-correlation of GDP rises from 0.32 to 0.33) under a centralised fiscal authority. This could make a single monetary policy for both countries easier as the impact of a policy change would be more aligned, for example. The largest differences between the status quo and a fiscal union emerge from the GDP correlation with the deficit ratio. It decreases significantly for Germany, as the domestic economy is then less closely correlated with domestic fiscal policy and because redistribution is then more pronounced over the business cycle. Developments in the rest of the euro area -in which the correlations also grow more negative, resulting in a more pronounced anticyclical relationship between the fiscal sector and the business cycle -stands in contrast to this. The centralisation of fiscal instruments means that they no longer have as much a targeted effect on a country's individual economy. For both countries, this results in a lower correlation between the business cycle and the fiscal sector. In summary, however, it is possible to conclude that -with a few exceptions -the economic statistics do not demonstrate any major differences between the status quo and the fiscal union scenarios. Apart from the examination of the statistical properties of the various fiscal policy scenarios, it is interesting to see how certain macro variables react to shocks in the economy. Here, we present the impulse responses of certain selected macro variables to two different shocks. These shocks are asymmetric, meaning they impact only one country directly, whereas the other country is affected only by spillover effects. We consider a supply shock (technology) and a demand shock (consumer preference) in Germany. For each of these shocks, we examine the responses of the macro variables in the four different scenarios.
Conspicuously, there is almost no quantitative difference on key macroeconomic variables across the various scenarios in the event of a technology shock in Germany (see Figure 2) , while some differences with regard to public debt are discernible. The adjustment back to the steady state is significantly faster given the existence of a centralised fiscal authority, since the burden is shared by Eurozone member states as a whole, in contrast to a reaction to the shock and its impact by German fiscal policy only. As a result, the debt ratio in the rest of the euro area reacts much more strongly than in the basis scenario. Taken together, the spillover effects of a shock in Germany, which are principally minor, lead to quantitatively minor changes in the rest of the euro area. These are most severe with a supranational fiscal authority because the deviations from the steady state are the most pronounced. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that European fiscal policy reacts most directly to a shock in Germany in this scenario.
The same picture with regard to the deviations between the fiscal union regimes results in the wake of a consumer preference shock (see Figure 3) . In this case, consumption rises, leading to an increase in prices due to the impact on demand. Production increases, which initially causes unemployment to fall. These two aspects lead to higher government revenues, thereby lowering debt. On the other hand, the macro variables in Germany are not different, whereas investment and consumption deviate slightly in the rest of the euro area due to the presence of small spillover effects. In the rest of the euro area, the initial dip in investments is significantly larger under a supranational fiscal authority relative to under the status quo. The largest changes are again apparent in the fiscal variables, both in Germany and in the rest of the euro area. Debt, therefore, varies more or less depending on the regime. The stronger fiscal integration is, the weaker the debt reduction. The reaction of the fiscal variables aims increasingly towards the European aggregate. Accordingly, less is cushioned through domestic activity than through foreign activity. As a result, the contradictory reaction of debt in the rest of the euro area is stronger the deeper fiscal integration is. Here, too, fiscal policy is the channel for the transmission of the differences into the real economic variables in the rest of the euro area. However, differences across scenarios are minor. Why is this the case? For an explanation it is instructive to consider the variance decomposition of the estimated model. A variance decomposition describes in detail which shock contributes how much to the (asymptotic) variance of the selected variable (see Table 3 ). The fiscal shocks (in Germany and the rest of the euro area) have an impact of just below 2% on GDP in Germany, whereas 98% of the business cycle fluctuations can be explained by other shocks. Similar values result for private investment and private consumption. However, fiscal shocks account for 15% of the fluctuation of the debt ratio in Germany. With somewhat higher values, this is qualitatively identical for the rest of the euro area. Fiscal shocks are responsible for around 3% of the fluctuation in the macro variables and for 25% of the fluctuation in the debt ratio. The impact of foreign fiscal shocks on the respective domestic macro variables is negligible. Forni et al. (2009) also find that fiscal shocks play a negligible role for the variance of key macroeconomic variables, but a more important one for the variance of fiscal variables.
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Welfare analysis
In New Keynesian models, different policies can be evaluated based on a modelconsistent welfare criterion. There, it is necessary to differentiate between welfare effects due to business cycle fluctuations (volatility effect) and due to changes in the steady state (level effect). Welfare gains and losses are expressed as a fraction of steady-state consumption. This is done by investigating how many units of steady-state consumption households would be willing to give up per period in order to live in a deterministic world, that is, in a world without stochastic shocks and therefore in absence of business cycles in line with expectations. We initially perform this analysis for each scenario, including the status quo. After that, we take the level effect into account and compute total welfare gains and losses from one scenario compared to the status quo. The respective findings for both Germany and the rest of the euro area can be seen in Table 3 . The findings are listed in per cent of steady-state consumption.
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In terms of business cycle costs, a representative German household would neither gain nor lose significantly in any form of a fiscal union compared to the status quo. In the scenario of revenue equalisation German households would be willing to give up close to 1% of their consumption to live in a deterministic world without business cycles. In all other cases, this value is zero. Accordingly, the inclination in Germany towards hedging against business cycle fluctuations through any form of fiscal union or demanding something in return for it is low, as the welfare gains and/or losses resulting from business cycle fluctuations would be very minor. In the rest of the euro area, households would have to spend a higher percentage to live in a world without shocks; this affects both the status quo as well as revenue and tax harmonisation with a nearly identical quantity of around 6%. In the case of a centralised union, they would have to spend 5.2%. As a result, this regime would be advantageous from their perspective, as would be the revenue equalisation with an amount of 5.5%.
7. Technically, we compute a second-order Taylor approximation of the full non-linear model around a deterministic steady state as in Lucas (2003) . Qualitatively, this is then also the case for the entire euro area, which would improve from roughly 4.3% to 3.8%.
In the lower half of Table 4 , we also take into account changes in the longrun equilibrium described above. Compared to the status quo, Germany (and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the euro area) would benefit from a centralised fiscal authority, while all other fiscal union scenarios yield a welfare loss from an entire union perspective. This model analysis accordingly does not allow us to conclude that fiscal integration (of the form discussed in this paper) will benefit the union as a whole. We further provide a robustness analysis in the appendix and identify the significant parameters driving differences in welfare.
Furthermore, a common argument for introducing a fiscal union often made in practice is that it alleviates the burden of (unjustifiably high) movements in risk premia. As our baseline simulations so far do not include risk premia, we perform an analysis of the same model that incorporates a premium on government interest that increases the closer the national debt level gets to some exogenously given debt limit similar to Corsetti et al. (2013) .
In Figure 4 , we show the development of welfare depending on how strongly risk premia react to such debt deviations from target. In doing so, we assume a quarterly steady-state default probability of 4% (which is a common assumption in the literature, see Corsetti et al., 2013) and vary the degree how strongly the deviation of the debt ratio from its target affects this probability. The more Table 4 Welfare analysis for Germany, the rest of the euro area and the euro area as a whole; welfare has been calculated as the consumption equivalent Fiscal Union sensitive it is, the more the default probability increases if the deviation of the debt ratio from its steady state is positive. It can be seen that the higher the risk premium sensitivity to debt deviations is the lower is welfare in all scenarios and countries. The reason for this is that the more the debt ratio affects the default probability the more volatile the interest rate becomes. This worsens consumption smoothing for households. The consumption equivalent that households are willing to pay in order to live in a risk-free world is, therefore, rising along with the reaction of the debt ratio on interest rates in each scenario. However, it is more interesting to see whether there are relative differences between the scenarios or, put differently, if the above findings regarding the ranking of the fiscal union regimes changes due to the risk premium. As we see, this is not the case neither for the rest of the euro area nor for the euro area aggregate altogether. In Welfare comparison for different fiscal union scenarios depending on the sensitivity of the risk premium Germany, however, we initially start with the ordering that we discussed above. For any risk premium, the scenario of revenue equalisation remains the worst alternative. If the deviation of the debt-ratio contributes sufficiently to an interest rate reaction, the ordering may be inversed for the other degrees of integration, however. The centralised fiscal authority becomes ultimately better than the status quo at high-risk premia and tax harmonization becomes inferior to the full integration scenario at relatively low levels of interest rate sensitivity to debt deviations. In aggregate terms for the entire union, these changes are, however, not strong enough to reverse the ordering here. While the above results indicate that our results regarding the costs and benefits of a fiscal union are quite robust to even alternative specifications of how government risk transmits through the economy, a word of caution may still be in order. First, the model simulations we conducted primarily contain standard shock processes, even though the estimation period includes the recent crisis. Hence, when one region should be hit by a very large shock, while the other is not, benefits of sharing the fiscal burden of such a shock may turn out to be larger. This holds even more should one region systematically be hit by larger (negative) shocks. Second, the rest of the euro area is assumed to be one large block within the economy. In the estimation process, shocks hitting single countries of this block may average out, thus, underestimating the volatility of the rest of the euro area. So for single -especially small and volatile -member countries of this block, it could be the case that a fiscal union regime is much more beneficial than what we report here, especially if these small countries indeed face the risk of losing capital market access. Whether or not those potential benefits are sufficient to turn welfare implications around should be addressed in further research.
Counterfactual analysis
The counterfactual analysis asks the question which course both economies would have taken if they had also entered into a fiscal union at the time at which the euro was introduced. More specifically, we examine the years 1999-2012 and simulate the model economy for the respective fiscal union scenarios.
The estimation of the model in the status quo results in a series of quarterly shocks (for technology, demand, government expenditure, taxes, etc.) for the entire estimation period. We assume that these shock processes remain as estimated and feed them into the model variants for the various fiscal union scenarios to allow us to compare the fiscal union scenarios and the status quo by means of a counterfactual analysis. 8 The findings of the analysis are shown in Figure 5 . 9 8. This assumption is -as in all counterfactual analyses -relatively strong, because we assume that the shock sequence would not have changed in the case of having revenue harmonisation, tax harmonisation or a centralised fiscal authority. It may, however, be likely that the shock sequences would have changed after such a policy change. Still, this exercise gives some insight into how a certain sequence of shocks (namely those of the last ten years) would have affected the key variables. 9. In this counterfactual analysis, we face the challenge of a mix of long-and short-term effects.
We, therefore, need to make an assumption regarding the structure. Here, we have decided to illustrate the different structure as a long-term equilibrium effect. Accordingly, we start out by deviating from the status quo for certain variables.
Generally speaking, it is possible to identify few differences between the individual forms of fiscal union and the status quo. In this respect, the key macro aggregates would probably have seen similar development under a fiscal union, provided there was no change to the shock processes. More apparent differences emerge in the case of a centralised fiscal authority, which is mainly due to the initial (i.e. steady state) effects, however. The same holds true for the evolution of consumption in both regions which also does not seem to be driven by cyclical factors but by the long run shift that is incorporated ex ante.
The largest differences emerge in the development of the debt ratio, which is, in some cases, highly divergent over time. In Germany, the debt ratio prior to the debt crisis would have been substantially lower in the scenario featuring a centralised fiscal authority, yet significantly higher after the crisis than under the status quo. In the basis scenario with the status quo, the debt ratio is lowest at the present time compared to the fiscal union scenarios. The opposite effect becomes apparent when looking at the debt ratio in the rest of the euro area.
As demonstrated in the previous sections, the findings vary the greatest if the focus is placed on structure and long-term effects. This can also be seen in the counterfactual analysis. Over time, the development of the macro variablessuch as consumption, investment and GDP -is practically identical. Changes only emerge if the starting value (i.e. the long-term equilibrium effect) is also taken into account. Short-term changes only become apparent in the fiscal variables, as seen with the impulse responses. This is not particularly surprising, as the macro variables are, for the most part, not driven by fiscal policy shocks as Table 3 in section 3.3 suggests.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we investigate quantitatively the effects of introducing a fiscal union for Germany and the rest of the euro area. To do so, we define three possible fiscal union scenarios that are discussed in the literature: fiscal revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. We find that the desired or expected international risk sharing through fiscal integration is rather limited and business cycle effects are minor. The reason is that fiscal shocks play a negligible role for the variance of key macroeconomic variables. From a welfare perspective, neither Germany nor the rest of the euro area would benefit significantly. Differences in the long run are primarily explained by the divergent structure of fiscal policy over the long term.
Although the model we use and the quantitative analysis are state of the art, there are some points which deserve further discussion. The three fiscal union scenarios we analyse are exogenously integrated, meaning that we do not focus on 'the optimal form' of a fiscal union or transfer mechanisms. Even though these forms of fiscal integration are debated in the literature, there may be welfare-improving schemes of deeper fiscal integration. In addition, our model -as the entire model class -is not capable of factoring in politico-economic aspects such as moral hazard. The simulations are, therefore, rather mechanical. Results must be viewed with these limitations in mind. Furthermore, we model the euro area and Germany as two large blocks. Were we able to disaggregate the rest of Fiscal Union the euro area (excluding Germany) even more, improvements in risk sharing could be larger because considering the rest of the euro area as one block may underestimate its volatility. This especially holds for small and potentially very volatile member countries, which play, by construction, not a large role when embedded into a large block. Further research should focus on improving the understanding of the importance of these drawbacks.
